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Abstract
Decompositional equivalence is the principle that there is no preferred decompo-
sition of the universe into subsystems. It is shown here, by using a simple thought
experiment, that quantum theory follows from decompositional equivalence together
with Landauer’s principle. This demonstration raises within physics a question pre-
viously left to psychology: how do human - or any - observers identify or agree about
what constitutes a “system of interest”?
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“Nature is relentless and unchangeable, and it is indifferent as to whether its
hidden reasons and actions are understandable to man or not.”
– Galileo Galilie
1 Introduction
The enormous empirical success of quantum theory provides strong evidence that quantum
theory is true, at least in the pragmatic sense of enabling correct predictions about the
observable behavior of the world. What has been unclear for almost 90 years now is why it
is true. Despite decades of effort, we have not found simple, intuitively-compelling physical
principles that lead us to expect quantum theory to be true. The theory is, instead, almost
universally regarded and presented to students as simply a mathematical framework that
makes correct if counter-intuitive predictions. Without a clear physical picture to motivate
the mathematical formalism of quantum theory, we are left with a choice between weakly-
constrained metaphysical speculations and “shut up and calculate.”1
My goal in this paper is to show that standard, unitary quantum theory is materially implied
by the conjunction of two simple, intuitively compelling physical principles. The first of
these is Landauer’s (1961, 1999) principle that “information is physical” or more precisely:
1) classical information – information encodable by strings of bits – only “exists” when it has
been encoded by a thermodynamically-irreversible state change in some physical system,
and 2) any such encoding requires a finite expenditure of free energy (for further discussion,
see Bennett, 2003). The second principle is that all fundamental physical interactions are
entirely invariant under arbitrary decompositions of any physical system into subsystems.
This principle of “decompositional equivalence” has been assumed in one form or another,
generally implicitly, from the very beginnings of modern science; indeed the possibility of
scientific investigation would seem to require a universe in which what we humans choose
to call things – in particular, what we choose to designate as the “system of interest” –
does not affect what is going on. What is shown here is that these two principles, taken
1The mathematical formalism of quantum theory has been subjected to physical and philosophical
interpretation since its inception. Bacciagaluppi and Valentini (2009) discuss the interpretative positions
advanced by the theory’s founders at the 1927 Solvay Conference and reproduce their original papers.
Bunge (1956) reviews the largely-unchanged interpretative landscape 30 years later. Bastin (1971) provides
a revealing glimpse of interpretative discussions following the introduction of Everett’s (1957) relative-state
interpretation, but prior to both the reformulation of Everett’s interpretation in terms of “multiple worlds”
by DeWitt (1970) and the introduction of decoherence by Zeh (1970). Landsman (2007) and Wallace (2008)
provide more recent synoptic reviews, the former with an emphasis on decoherence and the latter with an
emphasis on multiple worlds. The diversity of opinions on basic questions of interpretation remains large, as
documented by Norsen and Nelson (2013), Schlosshauer, Kofler and Zeilinger (2013) and Sommer (2013) by
surveying participants at relevant conferences. Both physicists and philosophers have found the seemingly
irresolvable differences between interpretative stances disturbing. Fuchs (2002) parodies interpretative
“camps” as fundamentalist churches. Cabello (2015) titles a recent, fairly exhaustive overview of the
diversity of interpretative assumptions a “map of madness.”
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together, require formal descriptions of the states of physical systems that are inferred
from the outcomes of finite observations to have the form specified by standard, unitary
quantum theory. Quantum theory thus emerges, in this treatment, not as a theory with
a “measurement problem,” but as a clear and physically well-motivated formalism that
precisely limits the information that any observer of any system can obtain by measurement.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section defines decompositional equivalence,
discusses its close relationship to classical reductionism, and shows that it is incorporated
implicitly into the state-space formalisms employed by both classical and quantum physics.
Both classical and quantum physics, therefore, materially imply decompositional equiva-
lence. The following two sections discuss two consequences of decompositional equivalence:
1) there can be no distinct or “preferred” class of observers and 2) all finite observation – all
observation subject to Landauer’s principle – can be described as interactions between an
observer and a black box as defined by classical cybernetics, i.e. a system with observable
external behavior but an unobservable and hence unknowable interior (Ashby, 1956; Moore,
1956). The fifth section employs a simple thought experiment to show that if Landauer’s
principle is assumed, the state descriptions inferred from the outcomes of finite interactions
between an observer and a black box must be those specified by standard, unitary quan-
tum theory. It shows, in particular, that the three principal axioms of quantum theory,
those specifying the Hilbert space formalism, unitary evolution, and measurement by pro-
jection are materially implied by decompositional equivalence when a finite energetic cost
of encoding observational outcomes is assumed. The sixth section discusses the physical
meaning of quantum superposition and shows how the standard quantum no-go theorems
are entailed by decompositional equivalence plus Landauer’s principle. It shows, in particu-
lar, that superpositions of quantum states can be replaced, without altering the formalism,
by superpositions of systems, even systems occupying classical states. The seventh sec-
tion illustrates the previous results using the double-slit experiment as an example. The
concluding section briefly discusses common assumptions of the “classical worldview” that
violate decompositional equivalence, Landauer’s principle or both and therefore contradict
quantum theory. These include assumptions that the sources of observational outcomes can
be precisely identified and that system preparation or any other physical process involves
local causation only.
2 Decompositional equivalence: A ubiquitous but largely
implicit assumption
Physics – indeed, all of science – is motivated by a deep intuition that there is a way that
the world works and that this way that the world works is independent of what we humans
or any other observers may say, do, or believe. This intuition underlies both the idea that
Nature has laws and the idea that those laws can be given a universal, observer-independent
mathematical formulation. It also underlies the idea of an experiment as a “question to the
world” to which the world gives an unbiased answer.
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This deep intuition can be made more precise by noting that to conduct an experiment,
an observer must: 1) designate a “system of interest” on which the experiment is to be
performed, 2) choose the experiment to perform, and then 3) manipulate the system of
interest in some way to “prepare” it for observation. While the outcome of the experiment
clearly depends on these three actions by the observer, it is universally assumed that the
processes by which the world produces that outcome do not. These processes reflect how the
world works, and how the world works is independent of what observers say, do or believe.
This distinction between the overt, observable behavior of the world and, as Galileo put
it, the “hidden reasons and actions” that produce that behavior is a key component of the
intuition that there is a way that the world works. Consistent with common usage, these
hidden reasons and actions can be referred to as “fundamental interactions” and taken, for
the purposes of the present argument, to be the fundamental interactions postulated by the
Standard Model plus gravity, string theory, M theory, or some future fundamental physics.
Let us focus on the first of the actions that an observer must take to perform an experiment:
the designation of a system of interest. A second deep intuition in both physics and other
sciences is that there are no principled limitations on what can be subjected to scientific
investigation. At least in principle, the choice of a system of interest is entirely arbitrary ;
any system whatsoever can be chosen. This arbitrariness is nicely illustrated by the com-
mon practice of considering some arbitrary voxel when discussing classical fluid flow; the
voxel boundaries can be drawn anywhere, without restriction, to focus attention on the
behavior of some small sample of the fluid. The arbitrary movability of the “Heisenberg
cut” in Copenhagen quantum theory provides another example. Conceptually including
the measurement apparatus or even the observer’s sensory organs within the “system of
interest” makes no difference to the way that the world works and hence no difference to
the processes that produce the experimental outcome.
The principle of decompositional equivalence combines these two deep intuitions by noting
that the choice of a system of interest is an instance of system decomposition; in particular,
it is the decomposition of “the world” into the system of interest and “everything else.”
The principle generalizes this instance to all decompositions, by stating:
Decompositional equivalence: All fundamental physical interactions are en-
tirely invariant under arbitrary decompositions of any physical system into sub-
systems.
In particular, all fundamental physical interactions are entirely invariant under arbitrary
decompositions of the universe U into a system of interest S, an observer O and a surround-
ing environment E, where E is taken to include everything in U not included in either S or
O. When stated in this way, decompositional equivalence entails a form of scale invariance:
if fundamental interactions are invariant under arbitrary decompositions of U into S, O
and E, then they are invariant under changes in the scales at which S, O and E are defined.
Both S and O, in particular, can be defined to be arbitrarily small or large, subject only
to the constraint that S, O and E together decompose U. Decompositional equivalence
requires, therefore, that there be no preferred scale of observation and no preferred scale
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of observers. If U satisfies decompositional equivalence, fundamental interactions in U are
independent of what any observer at any scale might choose to designate as the “system
of interest.”
It is important to emphasize that this principle of decompositional equivalence concerns
the decomposition of systems into subsystems and says nothing in particular about the
decomposition of states into substates or component states. Hence the claim that a com-
posite system X satisfies decompositional equivalence implies nothing in particular about
the state occupied by X; in particular, it does not imply that the state occupied by X is
separable in the quantum-theoretic sense, as discussed in §5 and §6 below.
Noting that any decomposition of a system into subsystems effectively draws boundaries,
equivalent to the voxel boundaries mentioned above, around the subsystems, the principle
can alternatively be stated as:
Decompositional equivalence (Variant 1): All fundamental physical inter-
actions are entirely independent of boundaries drawn to decompose a physical
system into subsystems.
or
Decompositional equivalence (Variant 2): The boundaries separating the
subsystems of a physical system have no effect on the overall behavior of the
system.
This last statement of the principle is closely related to the classical “reductionist” principle
that the behavior of a system is completely determined by the behavior of its “microscopic”
components. The historical reductionist program of fully predicting all macroscopic system
behavior from a theory of the behavior of such microscopic components plus a set of “bridge
laws” (e.g. Nagel, 1961) has largely been abandoned and “emergent phenomena” are now
widely regarded as unpredictable, perhaps even in principle, from the behavior of micro-
scopic components (e.g. Butterfield, 2011). However, such phenomena are nonetheless still
regarded as implemented by the microscopic components of the system and hence as (possi-
bly unpredictable) outcomes of their fundamental interactions. This reductionist principle
has been a mainstay of the physical sciences since the early 19th century development of the
classical theory of atoms; indeed, it is the principle that motivates the continuing search for
yet more microscopic physical components and yet more fundamental physical interactions.
Any system to which it applies must satisfy decompositional equivalence; if it did not,
macroscopic “emergent phenomena” could result from boundary-dependent alterations of
the fundamental interactions and would thus be determined not just by the behavior of the
microscopic components but by the observer’s choices about the placement of subsystem
boundaries.
It is worth noting explicitly that decompositional equivalence is a physical principle, not a
mathematical principle. As such, its theoretical role is both to motivate and to constrain
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the choice of mathematical representations of physical systems and physical dynamics. It
requires, in particular, that any correct mathematical representation of physical dynam-
ics must be independent of the mathematical representation of subsystem decomposition
and hence of subsystem boundaries. As will be shown in §5 below, the conjunction of
decompositional equivalence and Landauer’s principle materially implies the mathematical
representation provided by standard, unitary quantum theory. If both Landauer’s principle
and decompositional equivalence hold, unitary quantum theory must be true; if unitary
quantum theory is false, one or the other of these two principles must be false.
Conversely, both classical and quantum physics materially imply decompositional equiva-
lence by building it into their respective representations of the space of possible physical
states. Both theories employ abstract vector spaces to represent physical states, the real
phase space in classical physics and the complex Hilbert space in quantum physics. Both
spaces can be arbitrarily decomposed into subspaces using vector-space product operators,
the Cartesian product × in classical physics and the tensor product ⊗ in quantum physics.
These operators are both associative: for any decomposition of U into S, E and O, the
classical phase space CU = CS × CE × CO = (CS × CE) × CO = CS × (CE × CO) in classical
physics, and the Hilbert space HU = HS⊗HE⊗HO = (HS⊗HE)⊗HO = HS⊗(HE⊗HO)
in quantum physics. Both classical and quantum physics, therefore, require the state space
of any system to be entirely invariant under arbitrary product decompositions. In both
theories, moreover, physical dynamics are represented by a Hamiltonian operator that is
additive and therefore associative: if HˆU is the Hamiltonian representing the dynamics of
U, then in both theories HˆU = HˆS+HˆE+HˆO+HˆSE+HˆSO+HˆEO+HˆSEO for any arbitrary
choice of S, E and O, where HˆS, HˆE and HˆO are the respective self-interactions and the
higher-order terms are between-system interactions. Both classical and quantum physics,
therefore, require the dynamics of any system to be entirely invariant under arbitrary addi-
tive decompositions of the system’s Hamiltonian. Were decompositional equivalence shown
to be false in our universe, neither state spaces nor Hamiltonians would be arbitrarily
decomposable in this way and the basic mathematical formalisms of both quantum and
classical physics would have to be rejected.
As important as what these formal representations require is what they do not require. The
classical phase-space representation does not, by itself, require that position and momentum
be instantaneously and hence simultaneously measurable with arbitrary precision; it does
not, in other words, require the observable state of every or even any classical system to be
a point in phase space. Hence it does not require Landauer’s principle to be violated; indeed
doing so would render classical statistical mechanics inconsistent. This key component of
the “classical worldview” is instead a separate assumption that the classical phase space
merely allows. Similarly, the state-space representations of neither classical nor quantum
physics require the assumption that subsystems of every or even any composite system X
can be individually and independently manipulated, and neither requires the assumption
that observational outcomes obtained from a composite system X can, in every or even any
case, be uniquely attributed to specific, uniquely identifiable subsystems of X. It is shown
below that these two assumptions, both of which are central components of the classical
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worldview, violate the conjunction of decompositional equivalence and Landauer’s principle
and are therefore inconsistent with the state-space formalisms of either classical or quantum
physics if Landauer’s principle is assumed. Various standard approximations and idealiza-
tions commonly employed in both classical and quantum physics make these assumptions
and therefore violate decompositional equivalence, Landauer’s principle or both. Alterna-
tives to standard, unitary quantum theory that introduce a non-unitary physical “collapse”
process (e.g. Ghirardi, Rimini and Weber, 1986; Penrose, 1996; Weinberg, 2012), in partic-
ular, violate decompositional equivalence if the collapse process is taken to occur at some,
but not all possible, boundaries in the state space. It is the ubiquitous presence of ancillary
assumptions that violate either decompositional equivalence or Landauer’s principle that
render typical presentations of even standard unitary quantum theory paradoxical. When
both principles are explicitly and rigorously respected, nothing collapses, nothing decoheres
and there are no “multiple worlds.” As discussed below, a strict adherence to decompo-
sitional equivalence and Landauer’s principle replaces these interpretative standbys with
a deep and unresolvable ambiguity about the physical sources of observational outcomes.
The paradoxes associated with “collapse” are replaced, in this case, by deep empirical ques-
tions about the pragmatic abilities of observers, human or otherwise, to identify particular
physical systems as sources of observational outcomes, both under ordinary circumstances
and in the laboratory.
Demonstrating that decompositional equivalence and Landauer’s principle together mate-
rially imply standard, unitary quantum theory is surprisingly straightforward. The first
step is to recognize that if O can be chosen arbitrarily, O cannot be assumed to encode
any particular information about S prior to making observations. Therefore the only in-
formation about S that O can be regarded as encoding is information that O has obtained
by observation. Given Landauer’s principle, obtaining classically-encodable information by
observation requires physical interaction. Hence O can obtain information about S only
through physical interaction. The second step is to note that the subsystem of U with
which O interacts, which will be referred to as BO for O’s “box,” comprises both S and E.
Because U satisfies decompositional equivalence, O’s physical interaction with BO must be
invariant under arbitrary alternative partitionings of BO, i.e. arbitrary alternative place-
ments of the S - E boundary. This invariance of the O - BO interaction under arbitrary
alternative partitionings of BO renders BO a black box: if the observable behavior of BO
is invariant under arbitrary rearrangements of any subsystem boundaries within BO, then
O’s observations of this behavior a fortiori can yield no information about such subsystem
boundaries and hence no information about the “internal structure” or “internal dynamics”
of BO. The third step is to show that if Landauer’s Principle is respected, the acquisition
of information from a black box must be described by unitary quantum theory. The three
sections that follow make this demonstration precise.
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3 Information can be obtained only by observation
As before, let S, E and O be physical subsystems that jointly decompose the universe
U. If U satisfies decompositional equivalence, S, E and O can be defined or designated
arbitrarily; the labels ‘S,’ ‘E’ and ‘O’ can, therefore, have no special meaning. Any sub-
system whatsoever can be designated as the system of interest; similarly, any subsystem
whatsoever can be considered to be an “environment” or an “observer.” For a fixed S, in
particular, the E - O boundary can be varied arbitrarily. Any restriction on the kinds of
subsystems labelled with these terms, e.g. any restriction on the Hamiltonians HˆS, HˆE or
HˆO beyond the requirement that HˆU = HˆS + HˆE + HˆO + HˆSE + HˆSO + HˆEO + HˆSEO,
violates decompositional equivalence.
The statement thatO, the “observer” can be chosen arbitrarily naturally raises the question
of what “observation” means. Intuitively, to make an observation is to obtain a particular,
determinate observational outcome; to make an observation is, in other words, to obtain
classical information, information that can be encoded by a finite string of bits. Landauer’s
principle requires classical information to be encoded in a thermodynamically-irreversible
way, e.g. recorded on some physical memory. Hence an “observer” must have at least
one physical degree of freedom that can change in a thermodynamically-irreversible way.
Setting aside the question of how thermodynamic irreversibility is physically implemented
until §5 below, this requirement has two implications. First, O cannot be an “empty”
subsystem of U; it must contain at least one physical degree of freedom. An observer
cannot, in other words, be a merely notional coordinate system as is sometimes assumed.
This has the important consequence that all observers are inside U and hence that U
cannot be observed even in principle. There is, therefore, no “observable state of U” even
in principle. The second consequence is that the physical state of O must be well-defined
in the context of the S - E - O decomposition of U. Note that this does not require that
the degree(s) of freedom composing O must have a well-defined state in the context of any
other decomposition of U, and does not require that either S or E have a well-defined
state in any decomposition. Hence the separability, in the quantum-theoretic sense, of the
unobservable “state” of U is not required by the designation of some subsystem of U as an
observer.
While it appears trivial from a formal perspective, the arbitrariness with which S, E and
O can be chosen has important consequences for how any theory consistent with decompo-
sitional equivalence is interpreted and used. The first and most important of these is that
observers cannot be assumed to have any special characteristics or to be in any particular
special state at the initiation of observations. Observers cannot, in particular, be assumed
to have any prior knowledge of the system being observed. If observation is characterized
in Bayesian terms, the probability distribution over the states of the observed system prior
to any observations being conducted must be assumed to be uniform.
The assumption that observers have no prior knowledge of the system being observed is
often stated in discussions of both classical and quantum physics. Schlosshauer, for example,
includes the idea that observers can be “initially completely ignorant” when describing
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classical observations:
“Here (i.e. in classical physics) we can enlarge our ‘catalog’ of physical properties
of the system (and therefore specify its state more completely) by performing an
arbitrary number of measurements of identical physical quantities, in any given
order. Moreover, many independent observers may carry out such measurements
(and agree on the results) without running into any risk of disturbing the state
of the system, even though they may have been initially completely ignorant of
this state.”
Schlosshauer, 2007, p. 16
Ollivier, Poulin and Zurek employ similar language to operationally define objectivity in a
quantum-theoretic context:
“A property of a physical system is objective when it is:
1. simultaneously accessible to many observers,
2. who are able to find out what it is without prior knowledge about the
system of interest, and
3. who can arrive at a consensus about it without prior agreement.”
Ollivier, Poulin and Zurek, 2004, p. 1; Ollivier, Poulin and Zurek, 2005, p. 3
Both of these statements, however, leave unmentioned and unaddressed a fundamental
question: how do the many independent observers identify the system being jointly ob-
served? If they are completely ignorant of the system, having no prior knowledge about
it, then they cannot know, for example, where it is located, what it looks like, its mass,
or its velocity relative to their own. How then can they agree that they have observed the
same system? Identifying the system of interest, it would seem, requires observers to have
a priori knowledge of the system to be identified.
The above two passages illustrate two common and often implicit assumptions: 1) that the
observations employed to identify the system of interest are unproblematic and do not need
to be considered as part of a theoretical description of the observation process, and 2) that
multiple observers can, by observation, identify exactly the same physical system. They also
illustrate a common, subtle but important equivocation in the use of the term “system.”
When “system” refers to what the observers jointly identify, it refers to something, such as
an item of apparatus, about which the observers are assumed to have considerable a priori
information. The observers are, in particular, assumed to know where the apparatus is,
what it looks like, and so forth. When, on the other hand, “system” refers to what the
observers do not have any a priori knowledge about, it refers only to the collection of degrees
of freedom that are being probed by the experiment. This latter usage has been emphasized
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explicitly by Tegmark (2000, 2012) in his discussions of decoherence. As all components of
the state of the “system” in this latter usage are unknown by definition, this latter system
cannot, even in principle, be identified by observation. Hence the above passages also reveal
a third common assumption: that identifying the apparatus, or more precisely, the prepared
state of the apparatus, is sufficient to render all and only the degrees of freedom that the
experiment is designed to probe observable. This assumption can, informally, be stated as
the assumption that “preparing the apparatus is preparing the system” where “system” is
here used in the second of the above two senses.
As will be shown below, the three assumptions made explicit above all violate decompo-
sitional equivalence. Formal descriptions of measurement that stipulate, either explicitly
from a theoretical or “god’s eye” (Koenderink, 2014) perspective or implicitly through the
use of notation, that multiple observers have identified and are observing exactly the same
system not only beg the question of how this could have been accomplished, but are in-
consistent with the quantum formalism, which as noted above enforces decompositional
equivalence through both its state space description and the additivity of the Hamiltonian.
If the multiple observers can be arbitrarily chosen and cannot be assumed to have any prior
knowledge of the system to be observed, all that can be said is that each observer interacted
with a system – some system or other – and received one or more observational outcomes.
The observational outcome(s) received constitute each observer’s entire knowledge of the
state of the system(s) with which they interacted. As noted in §8 below, the question of
how multiple observers can, in practice, arrive at an agreement that they have observed
the same, or at least equivalent systems becomes an empirical question that physics must
answer.
4 Observation is interaction with a black box
A well-established, over half-century-old body of theory describes the situation in which
an observer can obtain outcomes from an observed system, but can know nothing about
the system beyond the outcomes that have been obtained. This is precisely the situation
of an observer who interacts with a “black box” as described by classical cybernetics (e.g.
Ashby, 1956; Moore, 1956) or of an observer who receives signals, via a communication
channel, from an unknown source as described by classical information theory (Shannon,
1948). A black box is, by definition, a system with observable overt behavior but an
inaccessible, unobservable and hence unknowable interior. Ashby (1956) and Moore (1956)
independently proved that, while observations of the overt behavior of a black box can
clearly place a lower limit on the complexity of the unknown mechanism inside the box,
no finite set of observations of the box’s behavior can place an upper limit on its internal
complexity. The very next behavior of any black box can be a complete surprise, one
that indicates the existence of unanticipated internal degrees of freedom and unanticipated
internal dynamics.
It is important to note that the term “black box” implies an epistemic boundary between
10
Figure 1: a) A system U is partitioned into two subsystems O and BO. b) The systems O
and BO have internal dynamics HˆO and HˆBO respectively and interact via HˆOBO.
the observer and the system observed, not a spatial separation. Hence one can, for example,
characterize a stock market as a “black box” for any observer who has access only to the
past and current stock prices. It remains a black box even for an observer standing in the
middle of its trading floor. The global climate is similarly a black box, even for those of us
embedded in it. Indeed Ashby viewed the theory of the black box as universal: “The theory
of the Black Box is merely the theory of real objects or systems, when close attention is
given to the question, relating object and observer, about what information comes from the
object, and how it is obtained” (Ashby, 1956, p. 110).
Consider now the behavior of a universe U that has been arbitrarily partitioned into two
subsystems O and BO as shown in Fig. 1. Decompositional equivalence requires that
this partitioning has no effect on the dynamics of U and indeed, no physical consequences
whatsoever; in particular, no physical separation between O and BO is implied. Let us
assume, for the purposes of argument, that the self-interaction of U can be represented by
an operator (notationally anticipating a Hamiltonian) HˆU, making no assumption about
the structure of this operator other than that it is additively decomposable. The partition
between O and BO then allows this interaction operator to be written as HˆU = HˆO +
HˆBO + HˆOBO , where the last term represents the interaction between the partitions.
In this case, the interaction HˆOBO can be regarded as defining a classical information
channel between O and BO and O can be regarded as obtaining observational outcomes
by interacting with BO. The channel defined by HˆOBO is, moreover, the only information
channel between O and BO. In particular, O has no independent access to the internal
dynamics HˆBO of BO. The system BO is, under these conditions, a black box from the
perspective of O; hence the nomenclature, “O’s box” for BO introduced earlier.
Note that the labels ‘O’ and ‘BO’ can be re-interpreted so as to designate BO the “observer”
andO the “observed system.” In this case BO obtains outcomes fromO via the information
channel defined by HˆOBO ; from the perspective of BO, O is a black box.
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The system BO being a black box from O’s perspective has an immediate consequence
of interest for any physical theory constructed by O: since any further partition of BO
is internal to BO, O can obtain no information about any such internal partition. This
becomes obvious when the relevant interactions are examined. If BO is further partitioned
into S plus E, the internal interaction HˆBO can be written as HˆBO = HˆS + HˆE + HˆSE. As
O has no access to HˆBO, O can have no access to the internal self-interactions HˆS and HˆE
or to the two-way interaction HˆSE. Indeed decompositional equivalence guarantees that
the interaction HˆOBO via which O acquires observational outcomes from BO is entirely in-
dependent of arbitrary redefinitions of the S-E partition and hence arbitrary redefinitions
of the interaction HˆSE. Hence in any universe satisfying decompositional equivalence, ob-
servers cannot “see” system-environment boundaries and observers cannot observationally
characterize system-environment interactions. The split between “system” and “environ-
ment” is both merely notional and entirely arbitrary ; it has no effect whatsoever on the
observable behavior of BO. Observers cannot, in particular, observationally characterize
individual states of either system or environment. All observers can do is obtain outcomes,
via HˆOBO, from BO, the black box within which the subsystems S and E, however they or
their interaction may be defined, are fully contained.
This limitation on the information actually obtainable by observers immediately implies
that the three common assumptions about observability made explicit in the last section
are illegitimate in any theory respecting both decompositional equivalence and Landauer’s
principle. Observers cannot, in particular, be assumed to identify systems unproblemati-
cally; indeed as discussed in §8 below, how observers manage to identify systems in practice
becomes a compelling empirical question. Multiple observers cannot be assumed to identify
exactly the same system, or even to uniformly distinguish each other from the surrounding
shared environment. Finally, even the identification of all of BO as a prepared apparatus
cannot be assumed to entail any specific consequences for any unobserved degrees of free-
dom within BO; as with any black box, the very next behavior of BO can be a complete
surprise that reveals the existence of unanticipated and uncharacterized degrees of freedom.
It should be emphasized, moreover, that no specifically quantum-mechanical assumptions
have been made in reaching these conclusions; they follow solely from classical cybernet-
ics or information theory when decompositional equivalence and Landauer’s principle are
respected.
The results of this section also show that the assumptions made in standard environmental-
decoherence calculations (e.g. Schlosshauer, 2007; Zurek, 2003) cannot be given anything
other than a pragmatic, post-hoc justification. Observers cannot, in particular, either iden-
tify the system-environment boundary at which decoherence is taken to occur or establish
that the environmental state is sufficiently random that system-environment entanglement
results in decoherence. While post-hoc justifications of the assumptions required for deco-
herence calculations may be adequate in practical settings, they cannot support in-principle
foundational claims; in particular, they cannot support the common claim that decoher-
ence explains the “emergence of classicality” from unitary dynamics (Fields, 2011; Fields,
2014a; Kastner, 2014). To claim that decoherence explains the emergence of classical system
12
boundaries when such boundaries must be assumed to perform decoherence calculations is
to beg the question. To claim that decoherence explains the emergence of classical system
states (“pointer states”) when an effectively classical state of the environment must be
assumed to perform the calculation is also to beg the question.
5 Decompositional equivalence and Landauer’s prin-
ciple together imply quantum theory
5.1 Overview
The primary claim of this paper is that decompositional equivalence and Landauer’s Prin-
ciple, taken together, materially imply standard, unitary quantum theory. Quantum theory
can be false, therefore, only if one or the other of these two principles is violated. Its sec-
ondary claim is that when quantum theory is seen as an inevitable result of decompositional
equivalence plus Landauer’s Principle, it ceases to be paradoxical. In particular, the need
for a paradoxical “collapse” process or for “multiple worlds” disappears. Indeed, when it
is seen as a consequence of these two principles, quantum theory appears to be simple and
intuitively compelling. It appears, in other words, as a theory we should expect to be true
from first principles.
To show that quantum theory follows from decompositional equivalence plus Landauer’s
principle, we consider a thought experiment that illustrates the simplest informative inter-
action between an observer and the world: one that yields a one-bit outcome. By working
through this thought experiment, we show that action must be quantized and that the prin-
cipal axioms (their statements in Zurek (2003) are taken to be canonical; similar statements
can be found in Nielsen and Chaung (2000) and elsewhere) are implied by decompositional
equivalence plus Landauer’s principle. In each case, the formal representation required by
the axiom is first shown to arise naturally under the conditions imposed by the thought
experiment. The contrapositive statement, that the axiom cannot be false without violat-
ing either decompositional equivalence or Landauer’s principle, is then demonstrated. In
so doing, we show why a number of common assumptions cannot be made without vio-
lating either decompositional equivalence or Landauer’s principle and hence contradicting
quantum theory. This sets the stage for an intuitive understanding, in §6, of why quantum
theory has the structure that it does.
5.2 Thermodynamics of observation
Consider an observerO capable of receiving and recording only a one-bit outcome. Suppose,
for example, that O is equipped with a horizontally-oriented meter stick that has been
modified to produce a digital “1” signal if but only if it comes into contact with an object
that is 1 m wide and to produce a “0” signal if it comes into contact with any object that is
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not 1 m wide. Suppose, moreover, that this observer is embedded in a world BO containing
many different objects, some number n ≫ 1 of which have a horizontal dimension of 1 m
while m ≫ 1 others have other horizontal dimensions. For simplicity, we can treat O as
fixed and unmoving, and imagine that some mechanism external to O occasionally moves
an object into contact with O’s meter stick. As before, BO is taken to include everything
in the universe that is not part of O. Figure 2 illustrates this situation, indicating by the
observer’s blindfold that only the “1” and “0” outcomes generated by the meter stick can
be detected by O. From O’s perspective, BO is clearly a black box: in particular, O has no
observational access to the mechanism that occasionally brings objects into contact with the
meter stick, no means of counting the objects, and no means other than the meter stick of
distinguishing them. This situation clearly generalizes to any finite number of measurement
devices yielding any finite number of finite-resolution outcomes. It represents, therefore, the
situation faced, in practice, by all observers that are restricted to expending finite energy
and hence to recording finite observational outcomes.
AsO explores BO, the meter stick occasionally produces a “1” signal indicating the presence
of a 1 m wide object; it also occasionally produces a “0” signal indicating the presence of
something else. Let us now invoke Landauer’s principle: recording each of these outcomes
requires a thermodynamically-irreversible change in the physical state of O. Each of these
outcome-recording state changes must, therefore, consume at least 0.7kTO of free energy,
where k is Boltzmann’s constant and TO > 0 is the temperature of O; Anders et al. (2006)
show that this is the case even for strongly-coupled systems, i.e. even if the local interaction
is far from equilibrium. For simplicity, let us assume maximal efficiency, so that each state
change requires exactly 0.7kTO. This free energy must be supplied either by O itself, e.g.
from an on-board battery that powers the generation of signals by the digital meter stick,
or supplied by BO, e.g. by extracting energy from each object the meter stick contacts.
In the first case, each bit recorded by O dissipates 0.7kTO into BO; in the second, each
bit recorded extracts 0.7kTO from BO. The O - BO interaction, which anticipating its
characterization as a Hamiltonian will be written HˆOBO, can, therefore, be considered an
energy observable from either the perspective of O or the perspective of BO; O can, in
particular, be regarded as “counting” energy increments of 0.7kTO. There is, however, no
“external” perspective from which the energy states of both systems can be simultaneously
determined; O and BO together constitute the whole universe U, and there is nothing
outside of U that can observe its state.
Let us now further simplify the situation by assuming that these outcome-recording state
changes are the only state changes that O undergoes. In this case, O’s state changes can
be viewed as implementing a clock that defines an observer-relative time coordinate tO. Let
∆tO be the period of this clock. Since O’s state changes only when this clock “ticks,” the
period ∆tO can be defined as constant without loss of generality.
It is with respect to this internally-defined, observer-relative time coordinate tO that O’s
state changes can be defined as “irreversible” and hence “classical”; indeedO’s state changes
are irreversible precisely because they can be viewed as implementing a clock. From O’s
“internal” perspective, this corresponds to their being both sequential and distinct from
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Figure 2: A blindfolded observer equipped only with a horizontally-oriented meter stick,
embedded in a world containing multiple objects, some but not all of which have a horizontal
dimension of 1 m.
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each other, both of which are intuitive characteristics of classicality. Note that in this situ-
ation, classicality has not “emerged” from the physical dynamics of the O - BO interaction.
There is nothing about the dynamics that imposes the interpretation of O’s state changes
as counting increments of transferred energy. This is rather a convenient theoretical de-
scription of the dynamics from the observer’s own, or from a theorist’s, perspective that
associates bits as units of information transfer with 0.7kTO increments of energy transfer
and hence defines time increments as an alternative notation for energy increments.
This intuitive connection between incremented time and classicality can perhaps be sharp-
ened by contrasting classical and quantum descriptions of a particle in a one-dimensional
box. In the classical case, each collision of the particle with the wall of the box results in a
reversal of the momentum of the particle; it can therefore be viewed as a measurement by
the particle of the position of the wall. Each such measurement dissipates an increment of
kinetic energy from the particle into the wall. The back-and-forth bounces of the particle
can, therefore, be viewed as implementing a clock; as the particle loses energy to the wall,
the clock slows down and finally stops. In the quantum case, on the other hand, there are
no discrete events in which the momentum reverses; the particle can, therefore, be repre-
sented as a standing wave. In this case, nothing is measured, no energy is lost and from
the particle’s perspective, there is no elapsed time. The t coordinate in the Schro¨dinger
equation is, in this case, not an observable and indeed has no physical meaning.
5.3 Quantization of action
As noted above, the interaction HˆOBO transfers 0.7 kTO between O and BO during the
time increment ∆tO. The minimum action of HˆOBO is then:
0.7 kTO∆tO =
∫
∆tO
HˆOBOdtO. (1)
As decompositional equivalence allows O to be chosen arbitrarily, let us assume that O has
been chosen in such a way that 0.7 kTO∆tO is minimal across all two-way partitions of U
into an observer and that observer’s world. We can then define h′ = 0.7 kTO∆tO as the
minimal action to receive and encode 1 bit in U and call it a “quantum” of action.
Taking U to be our universe and supposing that the energy efficiency of biological pho-
toreceptors has been optimized by evolutionary processes, it seems reasonable to estimate
a numerical value of h′ by considering such systems. For a molecule m of rhodopsin at
Tm = 310 K (i.e. 37 C, physiological temperature), ∆tm ∼ 200 fs (Wang et al., 1994);
other biological photoreceptors have similar response times. In this case kTm ∼ 4.3 · 10−21
J and the 1-bit information transfer action is 0.7 kTm∆tm ∼ 6.0 ·10−34 J·s, a value remark-
ably close to that of Planck’s constant h ∼ 6.6 · 10−34 J·s. We can, therefore, identify h′ as
h.
Note that this definition of h is entirely thermodynamic, uses no particularly “quantum”
concepts and does not appeal to any distinction between “microscopic” and “macroscopic”
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objects or behaviors. Note also that what is “quantized” by this definition of h is the action
of transferring one bit of classical information; indeed if no bits are transferred, there is no
elapsed time and hence no action. Jennings and Leifer (2016) have emphasized in a recent
review that a quantum of action can easily be reproduced within a purely-classical model of
measurement. One might speculate that had classical information theory been developed
before quantum theory, rather than the reverse, not just the quantization of action but
much else about the theory might not have been viewed as physically paradoxical.
5.4 Observationally-distinguishable states
Let us now adopt an explicitly theoretical, “god’s eye” perspective on the O - BO inter-
action; indeed this perspective is already implicit in Fig. 2. From this perspective, the
“ontic” physical state of BO can be described as a spatial configuration of objects, some
one of which may, but need not, be in contact with O’s meter stick. The mechanism that
occasionally moves an object into contact with O’s meter stick can be considered to be
implemented by a self-interaction HˆBO (again notationally anticipating the Hamiltonian)
that acts on these states. As this is the only mechanism that affects the state of O, we
can assume for simplicity that this is the only mechanism implemented by HˆBO. Both the
states and HˆBO can, from this perspective, be considered classical as further discussed in
§5.7 below.
The “god’s eye” perspective is not, however, the perspective of any observer; no mea-
surements can be made from this perspective. What is of interest is how the observable
results of the action of the dynamics HˆBO can be described from O’s perspective, using
only the information obtainable by observation to construct the description. This limited,
observer’s perspective, not the theoretical, “god’s eye” perspective, is the one that we, as
human observers, in fact experience. A theory inferred from this perspective is the only
kind of theory that can be constructed on the basis of observational evidence. As we will
see, a physical theory inferred from this perspective, i.e. a theory that describes transitions
between observationally-distinguishable states, has the formal structure of quantum theory.
As the only observational outcomes that O can obtain from BO are the values “1” and “0,”
O can attribute at most two observationally-distinguishable states to BO. Let us call these
two states |1〉 and |0〉. These states are clearly “observer relative” in the sense introduced by
Rovelli (1996); they are defined solely on the basis of the observational outcomes thatO can
detect. They are also “relational” in the deeper sense of being states imputed to BO by O,
where bothO and BO are themselves only defined relative to theO -BO decomposition. By
determining the interaction HˆOBO and thereby determining the outcomes thatO can obtain,
the O - BO decomposition fully determines the observationally-distinguishable states of
BO. Decomposition itself, therefore, resolves the “choice of basis problem” (e.g. Zurek,
2003). It is only when the decomposition is underspecified – typically by underspecifying
the structure and hence the measurement capabilities of and outcomes obtainable by O
– that the interaction Hamiltonian and hence the interaction basis appears to require a
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decomposition-independent specification. Once the outcomes obtainable by O are fixed by
a full specification of HˆOBO , any uncertainty about the measurement basis vanishes.
From O’s perspective, then, a sequence of observed outcomes . . . 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, . . .
corresponds by definition to a sequence of observationally-distinguishable states . . . |1〉,
|1〉, |0〉, |1〉, |0〉, |0〉, |0〉 . . . of BO. The effect on these states of the self-interaction HˆBO
can be represented by a two-component function {Eˆi} = {Eˆ0, Eˆ1} where:
Eˆ0 : |0〉, |1〉 7→ |0〉; Eˆ1 : |0〉, |1〉 7→ |1〉. (2)
The above sequence of outcomes then corresponds to the sequence . . . Eˆ1, Eˆ1, Eˆ0, Eˆ1, Eˆ0, Eˆ0, Eˆ0, . . .
of operator actions. These two components Eˆ0 and Eˆ1 of {Ei} are clearly orthogonal. Let-
ting HBO be an abstract space of to-be-characterized structure that contains |0〉 and |1〉 –
we will see below that |0〉 and |1〉 are in fact basis vectors of HBO – the components Eˆ0
and Eˆ1 clearly resolve the identity on HBO.
On the physically-reasonable assumption that the abstract state space HBO is measurable,
the function {Ei} is a positive operator-valued measure (POVM) onHBO, as required by the
measurement axiom of quantum theory (axiom iii in Zurek, 2003). Hence the requirement
that measurements be representable by POVMs is a consequence of just two intuitively
quite natural ideas: that any operation on any space only makes sense as a representation
of measurement if the space is measurable, and that the set of outcomes obtainable by any
observer is well-defined and, if Landauer’s principle is to be respected, finite (that obser-
vations can have only finite numbers of recordable outcomes has been stressed previously,
e.g. in Peres and Terno, 2004). A space fails to be measurable, however, only if it has no
σ-algebra of subsets over which a real-valued function that commutes with subset union
can be defined (e.g. Jauch, 1968). Decompositional equivalence requires that subsystem
boundaries have no effect on how a system works; it thus requires any function that charac-
terizes a system’s overall behavior to commute with subsystem union. A space that fails to
be measurable cannot, therefore, represent a system that satisfies decompositional equiv-
alence. Hence if measurements of a system’s behavior cannot be represented by POVMs,
the system cannot satisfy decompositional equivalence. Decompositional equivalence ma-
terially implies, therefore, the representability of measurement by POVMs. The POVM
representation and the labelling of observationally distinguishable states by outcome values
together immediately imply that an observation o leaves the system in the observation-
ally distinguishable state |o〉 (axiom iv in Zurek, 2003) as indeed shown already in Zurek
(2003). As all such states are observer-relative as noted above, no physical “collapse” is
implied by this notation; indeed any boundary-dependent physical collapse would violate
decompositional equivalence.
5.5 Unitarity
From the theorist’s perspective illustrated in Fig. 2, it is clear that the state designations
“|0〉” and “|1〉” are highly ambiguous; both refer to multiple spatial configurations of ob-
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jects that are distinguishable from a “god’s eye” perspective but are indistinguishable by
O. The state transitions represented by Eˆ0 and Eˆ1 are similarly, from the theorist’s per-
spective, implemented by multiple distinct changes in the spatial configuration of objects.
These operators, therefore, under-represent the unknown mechanism that brings objects
into contact with O’s meter stick. Note that this is true even if there are, in fact, only
two distinct objects in BO, as nothing in the specification of Eˆ0 and Eˆ1 can capture this
fact. Let us represent this unknown mechanism, from O’s perspective, by an operator
UˆBO : HBO → HBO acting on the state space HBO , making at this point no assumption
about the structure of HBO other than that it is measurable.
As O functions as a clock, the time coordinate tO can be used to parameterize the dynamics
that occur in BO and hence to parameterize the action of the unknown UˆBO. Each tick
of this clock and hence the two endpoints of each interval ∆tO correspond to some object
being brought into contact, through the action of UˆBO , with O’s meter stick. Hence UˆBO
can be regarded, without loss of generality, as a periodic function of tO with period ∆tO:
with respect to some arbitrarily chosen initial value tO = 0, one or the other of |1〉 or |0〉
is observed at each subsequent time tO = ∆tO, tO = 2∆tO, tO = 3∆tO, etc., so one or the
other of Eˆ0 and Eˆ1 must act at each of these times. Landauer’s principle guarantees that
the period ∆tO is finite, and hence that any such sequence requires finite observer-relative
time. Whether Eˆ0 or Eˆ1 acts so that |1〉 or |0〉 is observed after N clock ticks, i.e. at
tO = N∆tO can, therefore, be viewed as determined by the values at tO = N∆tO of two
tO-dependent, anti-correlated phase angles φ1(tO) and φ2(tO). As UˆBO is unobservable, in
principle, by O, these phase angles must be unobservable, in principle, by O. They must,
therefore, be represented as complex phases, i.e. there are real functions ϕ1(tO) and ϕ0(tO)
such that φ1(tO) = ıϕ1(tO) and φ1(tO) = ıϕ1(tO). Hence we can write:
UˆBO(tO) = α0e
−ıϕ0(tO)Eˆ0 + α1e
−ıϕ1(tO)Eˆ1 (3)
where α0 and α1 are real coefficients chosen so that α
2
0 + α
2
1 = 1. As Eˆ0 and Eˆ1 resolve
the identity on HBO , this UˆBO(tO) is unitary. The physical dynamics represented by UˆBO
is, therefore, symmetric in tO. From the “god’s eye” perspective, this time symmetry
corresponds to reversibility of the mechanism that brings objects into contact with the
meter stick. From O’s perspective, it corresponds to O’s inability to determine whether a
bit string that can, in the absence of a priori knowledge, only be regarded as random is
being read forwards or backwards. The unitarity of UˆBO from O’s perspective justifies the
representation of the self-interaction HˆBO , again from O’s perspective, as a Hamiltonian
operator.
The unitarity of the state propagator UˆBO for any closed, i.e. unobserved system BO is a
standard axiom of quantum theory (axiom ii of Zurek, 2003). As before, if this axiom is
false, decompositional equivalence must be violated. A failure of unitarity is a failure of time
invariance; it indicates that sequences of outcomes ordered in the +tO direction can be dis-
tinguished, in practice, from sequences ordered in the −tO direction. As tO is fully defined
by the O - BO partition, this asymmetry in tO can only be a consequence of the definition
of this partition. Decompositional equivalence requires, however, that partitions and hence
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their definitions have no physical consequences; hence any such asymmetry violates decom-
positional equivalence. Note that the existence of any observer-independent, “objective”
time coordinate t in U requires some boundary (e.g. an “initial condition of the universe”)
at which to be defined and similarly violates decompositional equivalence. The (in princi-
ple unobservable) evolution of U is, therefore, time-symmetric for any arbitrarily-chosen,
merely parametric coordinate t and is hence unitary. The unitarity of this inferred evolution
UˆU justifies the assumption of an additively-decomposable Hamiltonian self-interaction HˆU
as a representation of “how the world works” and hence justifies the representation of the
O - BO interaction as a Hamiltonian HˆOBO for any arbitrarily chosen decomposition of U
into O and BO.
The objective asymmetry of time is a central feature of the classical worldview that is noto-
riously difficult to reproduce within quantum theory. Objective, i.e. observer-independent
decoherence is often suggested as a source of asymmetric time (e.g. Schlosshauer, 2007;
Zurek, 2003), but as seen above, observer-independent decoherence requires the specifica-
tion of an observer-independent boundary at which to act and thus violates decompositional
equivalence as well as begging the question of classicality. Rovelli (2014) has recently shown
that an apparently asymmetric time, in any direction, can be obtained by suitably dividing
a quantum universe into multiple (N >> 2) subsystems and then adopting a coarse-graining
that defines certain variables as effectively classical. This procedure is not only observer-
relative but defines asymmetric time relative to a coarsely-observed subsystem; it therefore
respects decompositional equivalence.
5.6 The Born rule
From the “god’s eye” perspective, it is clear that the ratio α20/α
2
1 = m/n. One would,
moreover, expect from this perspective that over a sufficiently long elapsed time, the prob-
abilities P0 and P1 of observing |0〉 and |1〉, respectively, would be such that P0/P1 = m/n,
i.e. one would expect the Born rule (axiom v in Zurek, 2003) to hold. Because BO is a
black box, however, the numbers m and n cannot be determined by observation, so the
equation α20/α
2
1 = m/n cannot be derived by O. Similarly, the ergotic assumption that
the observed frequencies of |0〉 and |1〉 between tO = 0 and tO = N∆tO for some large N
correspond to probabilities of future observations cannot be proved valid for any black box,
as its validity would contradict the Ashby-Moore theorem noted earlier. The Born rule
remains, therefore, a useful rule for an observer, but it cannot be considered a theorem.
This pragmatic view of the Born rule has previously been advanced by Fuchs (2010) as the
appropriate view within quantum Bayesianism.
5.7 Hilbert space
As the propagator UˆBO is defined as acting on the state space HBO, O can attribute a state
|BO〉 to BO between observations by construction. At the time of any observation, i.e. at
tO = N∆tO for any N ≥ 0, this state is such that:
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UˆBO(tO) : |BO(tO = N∆tO)〉 7→ |BO(tO = (N + 1)∆tO)〉. (4)
Combining Eq. 3 and 4 to replace operators with the states they produce, we then have:
|BO(tO)〉 = α0e−ıϕ0(tO)|0〉+ α1e−ıϕ1(tO)|1〉 (5)
at any tO.
With the characterization of |BO(tO)〉 given by Eq. 5, it is clear that the postulated
HBO is a finite dimensional and hence separable Hilbert space, that the observationally-
distinguishable states |0〉 and |1〉 are basis vectors, and that Eˆ0 and Eˆ1 are von Neumann
projections. The generalization from two basis vectors to any finite number is, moreover,
straightforward. As any physically-implemented measurement device has finite resolution –
infinite resolution would violate Landauer’s Principle – infinite-dimensional Hilbert spaces
are, as previously pointed out by Fuchs (2010), merely a convenience for performing calcu-
lations.
The requirement that HBO is a separable Hilbert space is the final standard axiom of quan-
tum theory (axiom i in Zurek, 2003). Let us consider, once again, the physical consequences
of a failure of this axiom. First, were the state space of a physical system not separable,
it would be impossible to enumerate the basis vectors and hence the physical degrees of
freedom associated with any subsystem; the notion of “decomposing” the system into sub-
systems would then be ill-defined. If the state space lacked an inner product, there would
be no well-defined sense in which states could be regarded as similar or dissimilar. A sep-
arable vector space is, therefore, required by the most basic intuitions regarding systems
and their states. On the other hand, strengthening the axiom by limiting the state space
to real-valued coordinates is naturally interpreted as implying the in-principle observabil-
ity of every state. Unless additional axioms limiting the observability of some states or
combinations of states are imposed, the represented system fails to be a black box, thus
contradicting either decompositional equivalence or Landauer’s principle. As shown by
Leifer (2014), “hidden variable” theories consistent with quantum theory must impose such
additional axioms, either explicitly or implicitly through the definitions of the hidden vari-
ables; the observer’s blindfold in Fig. 2 provides an example of such a constraint. The
space for which the observationally-distinguishable states form a basis remains a Hilbert
space in such theories, as shown here for the “world” of Fig. 2.
5.8 Zurek’s “axiom o” and tensor products
Zurek (2003) includes among the axioms of quantum theory an “axiom o” stating that: 1)
U consists of systems and 2) the Hilbert spaces of composite systems are tensor products
of the Hilbert spaces of their constituents. The second clause is sometimes (e.g. in Nielsen
and Chaung, 2000) considered an independent axiom. If a Hilbert-space representation
of all systems has already been assumed, this “axiom” serves to operationally define a
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“constituent” system; its effect, in this case, is to limit decompositions to finite numbers of
constituents, thus avoiding non-separable infinite tensor products.
The first clause of “axiom o” can be read weakly as merely stating that decompositions
of HU are possible, i.e. that the notion of a “composite system” makes sense. It can
also be read as the statement that all possible (finite) decompositions of HU objectively
exist, i.e. exist independently of their observation by any observer. Any reading of this
axiom as postulating the objective existence of only some decompositions and not others,
however, violates decompositional equivalence (Fields, 2014a). Similarly, any reading of
the axiom as postulating that all observers interact with exactly the same systems violates
decompositional equivalence. Either of these readings import into quantum theory a com-
ponent of the classical worldview, that the universe comprises a collection of objectively
well-defined, physically-bounded, time-persistent, fully observer-independent objects, that
the other axioms of quantum theory collectively contradict.
5.9 Summary
What has been shown here is that the primary axioms of quantum theory, and hence
quantum theory itself, follow from the conjunction of decompositional equivalence and
Landauer’s principle. If quantum theory is false, in particular, one or the other, or both, of
these principles must be violated. Both of these principles express deep physical intuitions:
the intuition that there is an observer-independent way that the world works and the
intuition that effort and therefore energy must be expended to acquire information. We
should, therefore, intuitively expect quantum theory to be true. Indeed, we should be
utterly astonished should we ever discover that quantum theory is not true. Should we ever
discover, for example, that fundamental physical interactions change at the boundaries of
macroscopic objects, our deepest intuitions about the world would have to be abandoned.
Landauer’s principle and decompositional equivalence play complementary roles in quan-
tum theory. By imposing a finite energetic cost on information acquisition, Landauer’s
principle places a finite temporal interval between every pair of observations. Every obser-
vation is, therefore, coarse-grained in time as a matter of principle; finite resolution renders
all measurements coarse-grained in the measured degree of freedom as well. Coarse-graining
in time gives the world an interval between observations in which to change its state. De-
compositional equivalence, on the other hand, restricts what can be observed; in particular,
it denies observers access to internal boundaries and hence to bounded components of the
world. The only “states” that any observer O sees are states of that observer’s world BO.
These states are distinguished and hence individuated only by observed outcome values,
i.e. only by how the world affects the observer. Between observations, they can only be
represented as superpositions.
By ruling out “god’s eye” perspectives across the board, decompositional equivalence and
Landauer’s principle together generalize the restrictions on observational access noted for
specific cases in Leifer (2014). If the world is regarded as having, like the world depicted in
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Fig. 2, “ontic” states and behaviors that underlie the state changes observed by O, these
ontic states and behaviors of the world are unobservable in principle and hence unavailable
as an empirical basis for theory construction. The only states that are available as an
empirical basis for theory construction are the observationally-distinguishable states, i.e.
states labelled by distinct observed outcome values. Such observationally-distinguishable
states and the discrete transitions between them are fully described by quantum theory.
As decompositional equivalence and Landauer’s principle together imply that any observer’s
“world” is a black box, the present results can be summarized as showing that the terms
“quantum system” and “black box” are co-extensive. Classical information theory can thus
be regarded as a re-discovery of quantum theory from a different starting point and with
a different notation. Fuchs’ use of the term “interiority” to characterize the essentially
unpredictable nature of quantum systems (Fuchs, 2010) is therefore highly appropriate.
6 The physical meaning of superposition
6.1 Systems and states
The expressions in Eq. 3 and 5 are clearly superpositions; the operators E0 and E1 are
superposed in Eq. 3 and the basis vectors |0〉 and |1〉 are superposed in Eq. 5. The physical-
ity of superpositions is widely regarded as one of the central mysteries of quantum theory.
It is, therefore, worth reflecting on what these expressions mean physically. Doing so, as
we will see, casts the standard no-go theorems of quantum theory in a new light, showing
them to be the theory’s way of forbidding the interpretation of state-space decompositions
as defining observer-independent “objects” as they are conceived of within the classical
worldview.
When the observationally-distinguishable states |0〉 and |1〉 are viewed as states of BO
as a single, whole system, the superposition |BO(tO)〉 = α0e−ıϕ0(tO)|0〉 + α1e−ıϕ1(tO)|1〉
(Eq. 5) has the straightforward meaning given in §5.7: the complex phases and hence the
superposition itself reflect O’s inability to observe the inner workings of BO and hence
inability to predict what BO will do next. This is the standard epistemic view of the
quantum state developed by Bohr and Heisenberg and extended by many others into the
“ψ-epistemic” interpretations current today (e.g. Spekkens, 2007; Bub and Pitowsky, 2010;
Healey, 2012): it expresses O’s objective ignorance of BO’s internal state, ignorance that
cannot, even in principle, be resolved by observation.
The system BO does not, however, have to be regarded as a single, whole system. Like
any system, it can be arbitrarily decomposed. One natural decomposition of BO is into
two systems S0 and S1, where S0 is defined to be in state |0〉 and S1 is defined to be in
state |1〉. This decomposition renders BO a composite system. It also renders the state of
the composite system BO unobservable: with this decomposition, O can observe either the
state of S0 or the state of S1 but can never observe their joint state. Letting S(tO) be the
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notional single system occupying the states that O can observe at tO and replacing states
with the systems that occupy them, Eq. 5 can be re-written:
S(tO) = α0e
−ıϕ0(tO)S0 + α1e
−ıϕ1(tO)S1. (6)
Here the system S is a superposition of the systems S0 and S1. This superposition can be
given an epistemic interpretation as above: it expresses O’s objective ignorance regarding
the system that will be observed next.
Suppose now that O has an additional observable; for example, suppose O can re-orient
the meter stick vertically and receive a “1” or “0” outcome if an encountered object does
or does not have a vertical dimension of 1 m. In this case the “system” S1 can be in
one of two vertical “states”: some 1 m wide objects are also 1 m high, while others are
not (see Fig. 2). The “system” S0, however, can only be in one vertical state. If, on
the other hand, O is supposed to possess a shape observable that distinguishes objects by
the numbers of corners they contain, both S0 and S1 can be in any of the three distinct
“states” defined by having zero, three or four corners. Nothing, moreover, prevents O from
choosing to define “systems” by numbers of corners and to regard horizontal and vertical
dimensions as “states” of those systems. Decompositional equivalence allows any subset of
the available observables to be regarded as defining systems, in which case the remaining
subset of observables defines states of those systems.
If observers can obtain information only by observation – i.e., if they occupy a universe
satisfying decompositional equivalence – the distinction between “systems” and “states”
drawn above is the only such distinction available. Decompositional equivalence explicitly
forbids system boundaries, and hence the choices of observables that define them, from
having any physical significance. Human observers, for example, tend to use position, size
and shape to define systems, e.g. to pick out their favorite chairs or voltmeters from among
the other furniture of the laboratory. If the universe satisfies decompositional equivalence,
from the perspective of fundamental physics these choices of system-defining degrees of
freedom are entirely arbitrary, and there is no principled reason to assume that other
observers would make them.
The lack of any physical distinction between observables that define systems and observables
that characterize states has an important consequence: the claim that “system S is in state
|S〉” is simply the claim that some set of outcome values have been observed together. These
outcome values characterize the O - BO interaction and hence the state |BO〉, entirely
independently of any interpretative choices O may have made. There is, therefore, no
physical sense in which |BO〉 is separable; |BO〉 remains a superposition as described by Eq.
5, or its generalization to some larger basis, at all times. Entanglement is not, therefore,
an occasional characteristic of some components of BO but is rather, as Everett (1957)
recognized, the permanent status of BO itself.
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6.2 No-go theorems
The non-objectivity of system boundaries required by decompositional equivalence corre-
sponds, from an observer’s perspective, to an unresolvable ambiguity in the source of any
detected outcome. In the world of Fig. 2, for example, O cannot determine whether a
change in observed outcome from “0” to “1” reflects a change in the length of some single
object that is in continuous contact with the meter stick or a change in which object has
been placed in contact with the meter stick. Similarly, O cannot determine whether a fixed
outcome of “0” or “1” indicates continuous contact with a single object or an exchange of
one object for another with the same length. These ambiguities characterize the outcomes
obtainable by any observer of any black box, regardless of the number of measurement
devices that can be deployed or their resolution, as long as both are finite, i.e. as long as
Landauer’s Principle is respected.
The well-known no-go theorems of quantum theory, including Bell’s Theorem, the Kochen-
Specker Theorem and the no-cloning theorem, follow from these ambiguities about the
provenance of observational outcomes (for details, see Fields, 2013a). Each of these theo-
rems can be viewed as stating that a particular inference from observations is illegitimate;
in doing so, each reveals assumptions that conflict with either Laudauer’s principle, decom-
positional equivalence, or both. The no-cloning theorem blocks the inference that the state
of one system is a “copy” of the state of another system. Two systems can be in the same
state, however, only if the systems themselves are copies. Decompositional equivalence
prevents the access to system boundaries that would be required to establish this by finite
observations. The Kochen-Specker theorem blocks the inference that two distinct measure-
ment procedures, both of which act on a single subset of degrees of freedom of a particular
system, will produce the same sequence of outcomes. Such an inference depends on the
assumption that the outcomes of the measurements result only from interactions with the
specified degrees of freedom. As noted earlier, decompositional equivalence prevents such
exclusivity from being established by finite observations. Bell’s theorem blocks the infer-
ence that two measurements performed on distant parts of a system are independent; it
shows, in particular, that local causation and counterfactually-definite states cannot both
be assumed. Decompositional equivalence and Landauer’s principle together block the in-
ference that any two observations are causally independent. They place the “ontic” causal
structure of the world beyond observation, even in principle, and thus enforce a working
assumption that this causal structure, whatever it is, is arbitrarily complex. Even if the
ontic causal structure of the world is classical as depicted in Fig. 2, the consequences of
that structure for an observer can only be described, from the observer’s own perspective,
by quantum theory.
6.3 Physics without systems?
Physics is generally taken, by all but committed instrumentalists, to be about physical
systems. Equations of motion, for example, are taken to describe how physical systems
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move. Whenever a sentence begins with “Let S be a system with Hilbert space HS ...” or
similar language, the existence of some physical system is being invoked. Physical systems
are, moreover, assumed in all but special cases both to persist through time and to be
re-identifiable, at least in principle, through time. Bohr’s insistence on classical language
for the description of laboratory tools and procedures is founded on a straightforwardly
realist view that the laboratory itself and the apparatus, other equipment, and observers
within it are all well-defined physical systems that unproblematically persist through time
and are unproblematically re-identifiable following periods of non-observation. The near-
universal focus on states as the subjects of superposition, entanglement, and other quantum
effects in interpretations of quantum theory can be attributed to this deep faith that system
identification is, or at least can be viewed as, unproblematic.
A rejection of the idea that “physical systems” can be unproblematically assumed can,
however, be found already in Landsman’s (2007) “Stance 1” about quantum theory, the
claim that “Quantum theory is fundamental and universally valid, and the classical world
has only “relative” or “perspectival” existence” (p. 422). Nothing in this statement implies
that effectively-classical states have only relative existence - as they explicitly do in the
formulations of Everett (1957) or Rovelli (1996), for example - while effectively-classical
systems such as experimental apparatus have a firmer, non-relative existence. The discus-
sions of superposition and the no-go theorems above only makes the natural equivalence
of relative existence for states and relative existence for systems more explicit. It is inter-
esting, in this regard, that a view of systems as having only relative existence has recently
emerged as a natural interpretative outcome of work in quantum cryptography, where the
possibility that the device an observer thinks she is interacting with may not be the device
that she is actually interacting with must be taken seriously. As Grinbaum (2015) puts it,
“Device-independent methods convert the usually implicit trust of the observer (in, e.g. the
identity of the system of interest or the experimental apparatus) into a theoretical prob-
lem. By doing so, they erase one of the main dogmas of quantum theory: that it deals with
systems” (p. 2; parenthetical inserted).
When the ubiquitous superpositions in quantum theory are viewed as superpositions of
systems, i.e. as indicating an unresolvable ambiguity in the sources of observational out-
comes, they cease to be so mysterious. While natural language expresses the conceit that
“systems” are fixed and enduring things, we all know that this is not actually the case.
The microstructures of all systems are in constant flux. Living systems obviously gain and
lose material components, and hence become different physical systems, on a daily if not
hourly or even moment-to-moment basis; your own breathing provides an example. It is,
moreover, just an item of faith, sometimes explicitly propped up by appeals to Occam’s
razor, that systems do not undergo more radical alterations or even substitutions of one for
another while we are not observing them. The cognitive mechanisms underlying this item
of faith are becoming better understood, largely by studying their points of failure (Fields,
2012; Fields, 2013b; Fields, 2014b). Both cybernetics and quantum theory reminds us that
this faith-driven inference of object identity through time is unsupportable, in principle, by
finite observations.
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7 Quantum theory in practice: The double-slit exper-
iment
Quantum theory was originally developed not by considering thought experiments such as
that presented here, but by searching for a mathematical formalism that could explain the
results of otherwise-mystifying experiments. Once it was understood that light behaved
like a particle in the quantum domain, the already century-old double-slit experiment,
which when performed by Thomas Young in 1803 had demonstrated that light behaved as
a wave, became a mystery. Indeed Feynman, in an often-quoted passage, describes it as “a
phenomenon which is impossible, absolutely impossible, to explain in any classical way, and
which has in it the heart of quantum mechanics. In reality, it contains the only mystery”
(Feynman, Leighton and Sands, 1965, Vol. III, Sect. 1.1, emphasis in original).
The apparatus for the double-slit experiment is schematically illustrated, from the perspec-
tive of its designer, in Fig. 3a. A source emits particles or waves of some kind: photons,
electrons, C60 “Buckyballs” (Arndt et al., 1999) or even heavier molecules with masses up
to 10,000 amu (Eibenberger et al., 2013). These pass though a pair of slits, the implementa-
tion of which depends on the type of particle/wave passing through them, and are detected
at some distance beyond the slits. These components of the apparatus are connected by a
rigid structure that also isolates them, in darkness and under high vacuum, from the out-
side world. Observers employing the double-slit apparatus to make measurements do not,
therefore, have observational access to the internals of the instrument. Observers interact,
instead, with a “user interface” comprising controls that set the source intensity and the
states, either open or closed, of the two slits, together with a display screen that shows
the positions, on the x − y plane perpendicular to the instrument’s axis, of any detected
particles. The state of the instrument from the observer’s perspective is defined by the
states of these interface elements, as shown in Fig. 3b.
The phenomenology of the double-slit experiment is straightforward. If neither slit is open,
nothing is detected on the screen. If only one slit is open, particles are detected in an
approximately Gaussian distribution, elongated on the y axis and centered on the x − y
position of the open slit. If both slits are open, an interference pattern appears along the
x axis of the display, with the interference peak and valley intensities indicated on the y
axis. These patterns are maintained even if the source intensity is set to just one particle
per unit time. If, however, the detection screen is moved to be immediately behind the slits
(for photons) or some means of detecting which slit a particle passed through is installed
(for massive particles), the interference pattern disappears. The standard interpretation
of this phenomenology is that individual particles, even individual large molecules such as
the porphyrins employed by Eibenberger et al. (2013), act as waves, passing through both
slits if both are open and subsequently interfering with themselves. Both this ambiguous
wave-particle behavior and the fact that the interference pattern disappears if the particle’s
trajectory is “observed” by monitoring the slit it passed through are canonical “quantum”
phenomena.
Let us now consider this standard interpretation in somewhat more detail. If the source
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Figure 3: a) Schematic representation of the double-slit apparatus from the perspective
of its designer, comprising a detection screen S1, slits S2, photon or ion source S3 and
stabilizing structure S4. Real instruments may be substantially more complex, particularly
in the implementation of the slits. The dashed arrows show classical trajectories used to
collimate the apparatus. b) The double-slit apparatus from the perspective of an observer,
comprising a knob for regulating the source intensity, a knob for determining which slit(s) to
open, and a display screen on which detection events are recorded. The x and y coordinates
of the display correlate with the x and y coordinates of the detector as shown.
intensity is adjusted so that many particles are emitted per unit time, the resulting “beam”
of particles illuminates the plate S2 in which the slits are cut. Some fraction of the “beam”
passes through the slits and subsequently, the “beam” components that passed through
the left slit interfere with the components that passed through the right slit. This sit-
uation is analogous to what happens when water waves encounter a breakwater barrier
with two openings, as often demonstrated in laboratory exercises for beginning physics stu-
dents. Hence the “beam” behaves like a classical wave. This classical analogy breaks down,
however, when the source intensity is turned down to one particle per unit time. As the
interference pattern persists, built up one detection event at a time, it must be assumed
either that each particle went through both slits and subsequently interfered with itself, or
else that the particles can interfere with each other across time, with the first assumption by
far the most commonly chosen. In this case the trajectory of each particle can be thought
of as comprising two components. First, the particle travels from the source to both slits;
representing the x coordinates of the slits as l and r and ignoring the other coordinates, this
first part of the trajectory can be represented as |l+(r− l)/2〉 (the x coordinate location of
the source)→ (1/√2)(|l〉+ |r〉). This first part of the trajectory has, in other words, a fixed
starting point but a superposition of end points. The second part of the trajectory can then
be represented as (1/
√
2)(|l〉 + |r〉) → |xd〉, where xd is the x coordinate of the detection
event. Each particle is, therefore, considered to be in a superposition of x coordinate states
for its entire trajectory, excepting only its initial location at the source and its final location
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on the detector.
The x coordinate of each particle is, however, observed only at the detector. No aspect
of its trajectory is observed other than its detection at S1. Indeed, that the particle even
has a trajectory is an interpretative assumption based on the designer’s, not the observer’s,
perspective on the apparatus. The discussion in the preceding sections tells us that, from
the observer’s perspective, the apparatus is a black box, and it warns us that assumptions
made from other perspectives can rapidly lead to contradictions. Let us, therefore, set all
such assumptions aside and focus exclusively on the perspective of the observer. What the
observer can determine by observation is that the number of detection events correlates
with the source intensity provided that at least one slit is open, and that the number of
open slits determines the pattern - either Gaussian or interference - that is detected. By
appeal to the classical theory of waves, the observer can infer that the slits are far enough
from the detection screen for an interference pattern to develop whenever both slits are
open. Where, however, is the source? It is consistent with the observed detection patterns
that each slit is also a source; if a slit is open, it emits particles at the chosen intensity, but if
it is closed it does not. The question: “What is the source of a particle detected at time t?”
has, therefore, a determinate answer if only one slit is open, but if both slits are open, the
answer is ambiguous. This ambiguity can be expressed by representing the source as being
in a superposition (1/
√
2)(|l〉+ |r〉) of positions along the x axis, or following the reasoning
in §6, by representing the source as a superposition of systems (1/√2)(S3l + S3r), where
the notations “S3l” and “S3r” refer to left and right sources of particles. These alternative
expressions equally and completely capture what an observer can know about the source of
an observed particle. No more detail can be given. The question, “Where was the particle
before it interacted with the slits” cannot be properly posed.
It is important to note that taking the apparatus apart to allow inspection of the internal
components does not resolve the ambiguity. Once the instrument is disassembled, the
interference pattern disappears. Indeed any attempt to determine whether the particle
has a trajectory prior to encountering the slits disrupts the pattern, just as attempting to
determine which slit has been traversed does. The source superpositions (1/
√
2)(|l〉+ |r〉)
or (1/
√
2)(S3l+S3r), and the interference pattern they produce, can therefore be viewed as
a consequence - perhaps even a side-effect - of the isolation and consequent unobservability
of the internals of the apparatus. They are, in other words, consequences of the apparatus
being a black box.
Viewing the double-slit experiment in this way enables a clear prediction: interference pat-
terns should be observable in any situation in which the epistemic position of the observer is
as represented in Fig. 3b. From this perspective, the steadily-increasing reports of interfer-
ence phenomena in studies of human categorization that access information from multiple
locations in the category network (reviewed by Pothos and Busemeyer, 2013; Aerts, Gabora
and Sozzo, 2013) are not surprising.
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8 Conclusion
A scientific theory is a collection of intuitions and assumptions around which a mathemati-
cal formalism that enables precise and testable predictions has been constructed. Whether
the formalism is fully consistent with the intuitions and assumptions on which it is based,
and with the support of which it is used to generate predictions, may not be obvious. Quan-
tum theory provides a dramatic case in point: the formal axioms of quantum theory are
notoriously non-intuitive, and the extent to which they are consistent with common physi-
cal intuitions and assumptions is not obvious. The unexpected experimental observations
that motivated quantum theory, the no-go theorems, and the continuing demonstrations of
entanglement and other distinctly “quantum” phenomena all indicate that some, at least,
of the intuitions and assumptions that constitute the “classical worldview” are wrong. It
has often been argued that it is the implicit addition of such wrong assumptions that render
quantum theory paradoxical (e.g. Peres and Fuchs, 2000). The challenge is to determine
precisely which assumptions are wrong.
What has been shown here is that two deep intuitions, that there is an observer-independent
way the world works and that acquiring information requires spending energy, are consistent
with quantum theory, and when formulated more precisely as the principle of decomposi-
tional equivalence and Landauer’s principle, together materially imply quantum theory.
Both decompositional equivalence and Landauer’s principle place limits on the information
that can be obtained by observation; quantum theory provides a formalism for describing
observations of the physical world that enforces these limits. Empirical evidence supporting
quantum theory is empirical evidence that these limits are real. It is also evidence that
all intuitions or assumptions that conflict with decompositional equivalence or Landauer’s
principle are wrong. Combining intuitions or assumptions that conflict with either of these
principles with quantum theory is guaranteed to lead to paradoxes and inconsistencies.
When such intuitions or assumptions are rigorously removed from quantum theory, the
paradoxes can be expected to disappear.
Several intuitions or assumptions that play central roles in the classical worldview clearly
do conflict with decompositional equivalence, Landauer’s principle, or both. These include:
• That observers can interact exclusively with particular, identified subsystems of the
world.
• That observational outcomes can be exclusively attributed to particular, identified
subsystems of the world.
• That observers can “prepare” two or more particular, identified subsystems of the
world independently of each other.
• That multiple observers can reliably identify and exclusively interact with the same
subsystem of the world.
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• That observers can reliably identify and exclusively interact with the same subsystem
of the world at multiple times.
These assumptions all reflect underlying intuitions that apparent subsystem boundaries are
objectively real and that upper limits can be placed on the complexity of the world. These
deep intuitions directly contradict decompositional equivalence and Landauer’s principle,
respectively. They therefore contradict quantum theory.
It is important, moreover, to emphasize that by contradicting decompositional equivalence
and Landauer’s principle, these assumptions also contradict classical physics, in particu-
lar, the associativity of classical phase space decomposition, the additivity of the classical
Hamiltonian, and the 2nd Law of Thermodynamics. While classical physics is often taken,
informally, to both support and embody the classical worldview, nothing in classical physics
requires or even suggests that any of the above five statement are true. In his famous re-
mark about the moon, Einstein clearly assumes that his hypothetical observer would be
able to re-identify the moon as being the very same physical system seen before looking
away; however, nothing in classical physics requires or even suggests that observers have
such capabilities. Indeed classical cybernetics, a discipline firmly based on classical physics,
in particular on classical thermodynamics, demonstrates as discussed above that none of
these assumptions can be true of any observers that are limited to finite means.
Because the intuitions or assumptions comprising the classical worldview are taken for
granted in ordinary life, they appear regularly in foundational discussions of quantum the-
ory. The near 90-year project of interpreting quantum theory can, indeed, be regarded
as the project of showing that not just the laws of classical physics but also the classi-
cal worldview itself emerge as approximations from or are otherwise somehow justified by
quantum theory. This is evident even in Landsman’s (2007) formulation of his three cat-
egorical “stances” regarding the interpretation of quantum theory, all of which associate
positions on the correctness or completeness of quantum theory with the metaphysical sta-
tus - “absolute existence” or not - of the classical world. Landsman’s gloss of “the classical
world” as “what observation shows us to behave - with appropriate accuracy - according
to the laws of classical physics” (p. 423) implicitly assumes, as Landsman later points out,
a commonsense-realist metaphysics, one that nothing in classical physics requires.
This project to produce the classical worldview from quantum theory is, moreover, required
by most of its adherents to be either independent of observers altogether or independent
of any particular characterization of observers. Zurek (2003), for example, states explicitly
that “the observer’s mind (that verifies, finds out, etc.) constitutes a primitive notion which
is prior to that of scientific reality” (p. 363-364). Hartle (2011) insists that the information
obtainable by observers is “a feature of the universe independent of human cognition or
decision” (p. 983) and hence, apparently, independent of the observational methods or tools
available to the observers. While some (e.g. von Neumann, 1932; Wigner, 1962) require
observers to be conscious, most adopt the position of Rovelli (1996) or Schlosshauer (2007)
that the observer is simply a physical system. Fuchs (2010) lampoons the idea that quantum
theory should include an explicit model of the observer: “Would one ever imagine that the
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notion of an agent, the user of the theory, could be derived out of its conceptual apparatus?”
(p. 8). The assumptions of the classical worldview are, therefore, generally treated by
the interpretative project not just as facts, but as observer-independent facts. As noted
earlier, Zurek’s “axiom o” can easily be construed as a statement that apparent subsystem
boundaries are objectively real, and in this form it underlies the assumption of an objective,
observer-independent system - environment boundary in decoherence calculations. The
assumption that observers can reliably identify and exclusively interact with the same
subsystem of the world at multiple times underlies the frequentist conception of probability.
The recent Pusey-Barrett-Rudolph theorem (for an extensive review, see Leifer, 2014) relies
on the assumption that spatially-separated systems can be prepared independently by either
the same or different observers. In discussing this assumption, Leifer remarks that “we
generally think that experiments on separated systems are independent of one another ...
If we allow that genuinely global properties may be relevant even to an isolated system
then we open up a Pandora’s box” (Leifer, 2014, p. 104). If the global state of the world is
non-separable, there are no isolated systems. Pandora’s box is open and cannot be closed.
As Galileo put it so long ago, Nature is indifferent to the difficulties that this might cause
us.
Both decompositional equivalence and Landauer’s principle are straightforwardly realist
physical principles: they are claims about how a real, physical universe works. As shown
here, however, their consequences for observers are deeply if not radically instrumentalist. It
could be argued that this level of instrumentalism makes science impossible. Perhaps it does
make a certain na¨ıve-realist ideal of science impossible, but a pragmatic, everyday science
is obviously not just possible but extraordinarily successful. What makes our pragmatic
science possible becomes, in the present framework, a deep empirical question. How, for
example, are we able to identify systems of interest through time, isolate them “well enough”
to conduct experiments, and agree among ourselves that we have replicated both the system
of interest and the experimental manipulations? How are we able to treat the world as a
substantially white box instead of a completely black one? These are not, it is worth
emphasizing, philosophical questions to be resolved by either metaphysical speculation or
interpretative analysis. They are straightforwardly empirical questions that, contra Fuchs
(2010), demand experimental investigation and empirical theory-building. The fact that
we can get away, in most ordinary circumstances, with pragmatic assumptions that violate
decompositional equivalence and/or Landauer’s principle can only be an outcome of the
way the world works, including the way that we as observers happen to be embedded in it.
It is an empirical challenge for physics to understand this happy outcome.
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